What are Bearer Tokens and token_type in OAuth 2? – Stack Overflow


В этой статье мы поговорим о том, как работают JSON Web Tokens, в чем их преимущества, какова их структура и как использовать их для базовой аутентификации и авторизации в Express.

Вам не обязательно иметь опыт работы с JSON Web Tokens (JWT), поскольку мы будем говорить об этом с нуля.

Для раздела, посвященного реализации, будет предпочтительнее, если у вас есть опыт работы с Express, Javascript ES6 и REST-клиентами.

API Key:

An API key is a token that a client provides when making API calls. With API key auth, you send a key-value pair to the API either in the request headers or query parameters. Some APIs use API keys for authorization.

The key in the query string:

GET /endpoint?api_key=abcdefgh123456789

or as a request header:

X-API-Key: abcdefgh123456789

Hawk Authentication:

Hawk authentication enables you to authorize requests using partial cryptographic verification.

The Hawk Authentication parameters are as follows:

  • Hawk Auth ID: Your API authentication ID value.
  • Hawk Auth Key: Your API authentication key value.
  • Algorithm: The hash algorithm(sha266, sha1) used to create the message authentication code(MAC).

In the request header it is look like as:

Authorization: Hawk id="abcxyz123", ts="1592459563", nonce="gWqbkw", mac="vxBCccCutXGV30gwEDKu1NDXSeqwfq7Z0sg/HP1HjOU="

Rfc 6750 – the oauth 2.0 authorization framework: bearer token usage

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          M. Jones
Request for Comments: 6750                                     Microsoft
Category: Standards Track                                       D. Hardt
ISSN: 2070-1721                                              Independent
                                                            October 2022

       The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage


   This specification describes how to use bearer tokens in HTTP
   requests to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources.  Any party in
   possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") can use it to get access to
   the associated resources (without demonstrating possession of a
   cryptographic key).  To prevent misuse, bearer tokens need to be
   protected from disclosure in storage and in transport.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................21.1. Notational Conventions .....................................31.2. Terminology ................................................31.3. Overview ...................................................32. Authenticated Requests ..........................................42.1. Authorization Request Header Field .........................52.2. Form-Encoded Body Parameter ................................52.3. URI Query Parameter ........................................63. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field ......................73.1. Error Codes ................................................94. Example Access Token Response ..................................105. Security Considerations ........................................105.1. Security Threats ..........................................105.2. Threat Mitigation .........................................115.3. Summary of Recommendations ................................136. IANA Considerations ............................................146.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration ......................146.1.1. The "Bearer" OAuth Access Token Type ...............146.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration .......................146.2.1. The "invalid_request" Error Value ..................146.2.2. The "invalid_token" Error Value ....................156.2.3. The "insufficient_scope" Error Value ...............157. References .....................................................157.1. Normative References ......................................157.2. Informative References ....................................17Appendix A. Acknowledgements ......................................181.  Introduction

   OAuth enables clients to access protected resources by obtaining an
   access token, which is defined in "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework" [RFC6749] as "a string representing an access
   authorization issued to the client", rather than using the resource
   owner's credentials directly.

   Tokens are issued to clients by an authorization server with the
   approval of the resource owner.  The client uses the access token to
   access the protected resources hosted by the resource server.  This
   specification describes how to make protected resource requests when
   the OAuth access token is a bearer token.

   This specification defines the use of bearer tokens over HTTP/1.1
   [RFC2616] using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] to access
   protected resources.  TLS is mandatory to implement and use with this
   specification; other specifications may extend this specification for
   use with other protocols.  While designed for use with access tokens

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   resulting from OAuth 2.0 authorization [RFC6749] flows to access
   OAuth protected resources, this specification actually defines a
   general HTTP authorization method that can be used with bearer tokens
   from any source to access any resources protected by those bearer
   tokens.  The Bearer authentication scheme is intended primarily for
   server authentication using the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization
   HTTP headers but does not preclude its use for proxy authentication.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in
   RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].

   This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of
   [RFC5234].  Additionally, the following rules are included from
   HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617]: auth-param and auth-scheme; and from "Uniform
   Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" [RFC3986]: URI-reference.

   Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
   are case sensitive.

1.2.  Terminology

   Bearer Token
      A security token with the property that any party in possession of
      the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other
      party in possession of it can.  Using a bearer token does not
      require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key material

   All other terms are as defined in "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework" [RFC6749].

1.3.  Overview

   OAuth provides a method for clients to access a protected resource on
   behalf of a resource owner.  In the general case, before a client can
   access a protected resource, it must first obtain an authorization
   grant from the resource owner and then exchange the authorization
   grant for an access token.  The access token represents the grant's
   scope, duration, and other attributes granted by the authorization
   grant.  The client accesses the protected resource by presenting the
   access token to the resource server.  In some cases, a client can
   directly present its own credentials to an authorization server to
   obtain an access token without having to first obtain an
   authorization grant from a resource owner.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   The access token provides an abstraction, replacing different
   authorization constructs (e.g., username and password, assertion) for
   a single token understood by the resource server.  This abstraction
   enables issuing access tokens valid for a short time period, as well
   as removing the resource server's need to understand a wide range of
   authentication schemes.

      --------                                 --------------- 
     |        |--(A)- Authorization Request ->|   Resource    |
     |        |                               |     Owner     |
     |        |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---|               |
     |        |                                --------------- 
     |        |
     |        |                                --------------- 
     |        |--(C)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization |
     | Client |                               |     Server    |
     |        |<-(D)----- Access Token -------|               |
     |        |                                --------------- 
     |        |
     |        |                                --------------- 
     |        |--(E)----- Access Token ------>|    Resource   |
     |        |                               |     Server    |
     |        |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---|               |
      --------                                 --------------- 

                     Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow

   The abstract OAuth 2.0 flow illustrated in Figure 1 describes the
   interaction between the client, resource owner, authorization server,
   and resource server (described in [RFC6749]).  The following two
   steps are specified within this document:

   (E)  The client requests the protected resource from the resource
        server and authenticates by presenting the access token.

   (F)  The resource server validates the access token, and if valid,
        serves the request.

   This document also imposes semantic requirements upon the access
   token returned in step (D).

2.  Authenticated Requests

   This section defines three methods of sending bearer access tokens in
   resource requests to resource servers.  Clients MUST NOT use more
   than one method to transmit the token in each request.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 20222.1.  Authorization Request Header Field

   When sending the access token in the "Authorization" request header
   field defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617], the client uses the "Bearer"
   authentication scheme to transmit the access token.

   For example:

     GET /resource HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM

   The syntax of the "Authorization" header field for this scheme
   follows the usage of the Basic scheme defined in Section 2 of
   [RFC2617].  Note that, as with Basic, it does not conform to the
   generic syntax defined in Section 1.2 of [RFC2617] but is compatible
   with the general authentication framework being developed for
   HTTP 1.1 [HTTP-AUTH], although it does not follow the preferred
   practice outlined therein in order to reflect existing deployments.
   The syntax for Bearer credentials is as follows:

     b64token    = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
                       "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / " " / "/" ) *"="
     credentials = "Bearer" 1*SP b64token

   Clients SHOULD make authenticated requests with a bearer token using
   the "Authorization" request header field with the "Bearer" HTTP
   authorization scheme.  Resource servers MUST support this method.

2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter

   When sending the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the
   client adds the access token to the request-body using the
   "access_token" parameter.  The client MUST NOT use this method unless
   all of the following conditions are met:

   o  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
      field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

   o  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
      "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
      HTML 4.01 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224].

   o  The HTTP request entity-body is single-part.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   o  The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entirely
      of ASCII [USASCII] characters.

   o  The HTTP request method is one for which the request-body has
      defined semantics.  In particular, this means that the "GET"
      method MUST NOT be used.

   The entity-body MAY include other request-specific parameters, in
   which case the "access_token" parameter MUST be properly separated
   from the request-specific parameters using "&" character(s) (ASCII
   code 38).

   For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
   transport-layer security:

     POST /resource HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded


   The "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" method SHOULD NOT be used
   except in application contexts where participating browsers do not
   have access to the "Authorization" request header field.  Resource
   servers MAY support this method.

2.3.  URI Query Parameter

   When sending the access token in the HTTP request URI, the client
   adds the access token to the request URI query component as defined
   by "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" [RFC3986],
   using the "access_token" parameter.

   For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
   transport-layer security:

     GET /resource?access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com

   The HTTP request URI query can include other request-specific
   parameters, in which case the "access_token" parameter MUST be
   properly separated from the request-specific parameters using "&"
   character(s) (ASCII code 38).

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   For example:


   Clients using the URI Query Parameter method SHOULD also send a
   Cache-Control header containing the "no-store" option.  Server
   success (2XX status) responses to these requests SHOULD contain a
   Cache-Control header with the "private" option.

   Because of the security weaknesses associated with the URI method
   (see Section 5), including the high likelihood that the URL
   containing the access token will be logged, it SHOULD NOT be used
   unless it is impossible to transport the access token in the
   "Authorization" request header field or the HTTP request entity-body.
   Resource servers MAY support this method.

   This method is included to document current use; its use is not
   recommended, due to its security deficiencies (see Section 5) and
   also because it uses a reserved query parameter name, which is
   counter to URI namespace best practices, per "Architecture of the
   World Wide Web, Volume One" [W3C.REC-webarch-20041215].

3.  The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field

   If the protected resource request does not include authentication
   credentials or does not contain an access token that enables access
   to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HTTP
   "WWW-Authenticate" response header field; it MAY include it in
   response to other conditions as well.  The "WWW-Authenticate" header
   field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617].

   All challenges defined by this specification MUST use the auth-scheme
   value "Bearer".  This scheme MUST be followed by one or more
   auth-param values.  The auth-param attributes used or defined by this
   specification are as follows.  Other auth-param attributes MAY be
   used as well.

   A "realm" attribute MAY be included to indicate the scope of
   protection in the manner described in HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617].  The
   "realm" attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.

   The "scope" attribute is defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC6749].  The
   "scope" attribute is a space-delimited list of case-sensitive scope
   values indicating the required scope of the access token for
   accessing the requested resource. "scope" values are implementation
   defined; there is no centralized registry for them; allowed values
   are defined by the authorization server.  The order of "scope" values
   is not significant.  In some cases, the "scope" value will be used

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   when requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access to
   utilize the protected resource.  Use of the "scope" attribute is
   OPTIONAL.  The "scope" attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.  The
   "scope" value is intended for programmatic use and is not meant to be
   displayed to end-users.

   Two example scope values follow; these are taken from the OpenID
   Connect [OpenID.Messages] and the Open Authentication Technology
   Committee (OATC) Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol [OMAP]
   OAuth 2.0 use cases, respectively:

     scope="openid profile email"

   If the protected resource request included an access token and failed
   authentication, the resource server SHOULD include the "error"
   attribute to provide the client with the reason why the access
   request was declined.  The parameter value is described in
   Section 3.1.  In addition, the resource server MAY include the
   "error_description" attribute to provide developers a human-readable
   explanation that is not meant to be displayed to end-users.  It also
   MAY include the "error_uri" attribute with an absolute URI
   identifying a human-readable web page explaining the error.  The
   "error", "error_description", and "error_uri" attributes MUST NOT
   appear more than once.

   Values for the "scope" attribute (specified in Appendix A.4 of
   [RFC6749]) MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B
   / %x5D-7E for representing scope values and %x20 for delimiters
   between scope values.  Values for the "error" and "error_description"
   attributes (specified in Appendixes A.7 and A.8 of [RFC6749]) MUST
   NOT include characters outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
   Values for the "error_uri" attribute (specified in Appendix A.9 of
   [RFC6749]) MUST conform to the URI-reference syntax and thus MUST NOT
   include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.

   For example, in response to a protected resource request without

     HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
     WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   And in response to a protected resource request with an
   authentication attempt using an expired access token:

     HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
     WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example",
                       error_description="The access token expired"

3.1.  Error Codes

   When a request fails, the resource server responds using the
   appropriate HTTP status code (typically, 400, 401, 403, or 405) and
   includes one of the following error codes in the response:

         The request is missing a required parameter, includes an
         unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same
         parameter, uses more than one method for including an access
         token, or is otherwise malformed.  The resource server SHOULD
         respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.

         The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or
         invalid for other reasons.  The resource SHOULD respond with
         the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code.  The client MAY
         request a new access token and retry the protected resource

         The request requires higher privileges than provided by the
         access token.  The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP
         403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the "scope"
         attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected

   If the request lacks any authentication information (e.g., the client
   was unaware that authentication is necessary or attempted using an
   unsupported authentication method), the resource server SHOULD NOT
   include an error code or other error information.

   For example:

     HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
     WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 20224.  Example Access Token Response

   Typically, a bearer token is returned to the client as part of an
   OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token response.  An example of such a
   response is:

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
     Cache-Control: no-store
     Pragma: no-cache


5.  Security Considerations

   This section describes the relevant security threats regarding token
   handling when using bearer tokens and describes how to mitigate these

5.1.  Security Threats

   The following list presents several common threats against protocols
   utilizing some form of tokens.  This list of threats is based on NIST
   Special Publication 800-63 [NIST800-63].  Since this document builds
   on the OAuth 2.0 Authorization specification [RFC6749], we exclude a
   discussion of threats that are described there or in related

   Token manufacture/modification:  An attacker may generate a bogus
      token or modify the token contents (such as the authentication or
      attribute statements) of an existing token, causing the resource
      server to grant inappropriate access to the client.  For example,
      an attacker may modify the token to extend the validity period; a
      malicious client may modify the assertion to gain access to
      information that they should not be able to view.

   Token disclosure:  Tokens may contain authentication and attribute
      statements that include sensitive information.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   Token redirect:  An attacker uses a token generated for consumption
      by one resource server to gain access to a different resource
      server that mistakenly believes the token to be for it.

   Token replay:  An attacker attempts to use a token that has already
      been used with that resource server in the past.

5.2.  Threat Mitigation

   A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents
   of the token by using a digital signature or a Message Authentication
   Code (MAC).  Alternatively, a bearer token can contain a reference to
   authorization information, rather than encoding the information
   directly.  Such references MUST be infeasible for an attacker to
   guess; using a reference may require an extra interaction between a
   server and the token issuer to resolve the reference to the
   authorization information.  The mechanics of such an interaction are
   not defined by this specification.

   This document does not specify the encoding or the contents of the
   token; hence, detailed recommendations about the means of
   guaranteeing token integrity protection are outside the scope of this
   document.  The token integrity protection MUST be sufficient to
   prevent the token from being modified.

   To deal with token redirect, it is important for the authorization
   server to include the identity of the intended recipients (the
   audience), typically a single resource server (or a list of resource
   servers), in the token.  Restricting the use of the token to a
   specific scope is also RECOMMENDED.

   The authorization server MUST implement TLS.  Which version(s) ought
   to be implemented will vary over time and will depend on the
   widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time
   of implementation.  At the time of this writing, TLS version 1.2
   [RFC5246] is the most recent version, but it has very limited actual
   deployment and might not be readily available in implementation
   toolkits.  TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246] is the most widely deployed
   version and will give the broadest interoperability.

   To protect against token disclosure, confidentiality protection MUST
   be applied using TLS [RFC5246] with a ciphersuite that provides
   confidentiality and integrity protection.  This requires that the
   communication interaction between the client and the authorization
   server, as well as the interaction between the client and the
   resource server, utilize confidentiality and integrity protection.
   Since TLS is mandatory to implement and to use with this
   specification, it is the preferred approach for preventing token

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   disclosure via the communication channel.  For those cases where the
   client is prevented from observing the contents of the token, token
   encryption MUST be applied in addition to the usage of TLS
   protection.  As a further defense against token disclosure, the
   client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making requests
   to protected resources, including checking the Certificate Revocation
   List (CRL) [RFC5280].

   Cookies are typically transmitted in the clear.  Thus, any
   information contained in them is at risk of disclosure.  Therefore,
   bearer tokens MUST NOT be stored in cookies that can be sent in the
   clear.  See "HTTP State Management Mechanism" [RFC6265] for security
   considerations about cookies.

   In some deployments, including those utilizing load balancers, the
   TLS connection to the resource server terminates prior to the actual
   server that provides the resource.  This could leave the token
   unprotected between the front-end server where the TLS connection
   terminates and the back-end server that provides the resource.  In
   such deployments, sufficient measures MUST be employed to ensure
   confidentiality of the token between the front-end and back-end
   servers; encryption of the token is one such possible measure.

   To deal with token capture and replay, the following recommendations
   are made: First, the lifetime of the token MUST be limited; one means
   of achieving this is by putting a validity time field inside the
   protected part of the token.  Note that using short-lived (one hour
   or less) tokens reduces the impact of them being leaked.  Second,
   confidentiality protection of the exchanges between the client and
   the authorization server and between the client and the resource
   server MUST be applied.  As a consequence, no eavesdropper along the
   communication path is able to observe the token exchange.
   Consequently, such an on-path adversary cannot replay the token.
   Furthermore, when presenting the token to a resource server, the
   client MUST verify the identity of that resource server, as per
   Section 3.1 of "HTTP Over TLS" [RFC2818].  Note that the client MUST
   validate the TLS certificate chain when making these requests to
   protected resources.  Presenting the token to an unauthenticated and
   unauthorized resource server or failing to validate the certificate
   chain will allow adversaries to steal the token and gain unauthorized
   access to protected resources.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 20225.3.  Summary of Recommendations

   Safeguard bearer tokens:  Client implementations MUST ensure that
      bearer tokens are not leaked to unintended parties, as they will
      be able to use them to gain access to protected resources.  This
      is the primary security consideration when using bearer tokens and
      underlies all the more specific recommendations that follow.

   Validate TLS certificate chains:  The client MUST validate the TLS
      certificate chain when making requests to protected resources.
      Failing to do so may enable DNS hijacking attacks to steal the
      token and gain unintended access.

   Always use TLS (https):  Clients MUST always use TLS [RFC5246]
      (https) or equivalent transport security when making requests with
      bearer tokens.  Failing to do so exposes the token to numerous
      attacks that could give attackers unintended access.

   Don't store bearer tokens in cookies:  Implementations MUST NOT store
      bearer tokens within cookies that can be sent in the clear (which
      is the default transmission mode for cookies).  Implementations
      that do store bearer tokens in cookies MUST take precautions
      against cross-site request forgery.

   Issue short-lived bearer tokens:  Token servers SHOULD issue
      short-lived (one hour or less) bearer tokens, particularly when
      issuing tokens to clients that run within a web browser or other
      environments where information leakage may occur.  Using
      short-lived bearer tokens can reduce the impact of them being

   Issue scoped bearer tokens:  Token servers SHOULD issue bearer tokens
      that contain an audience restriction, scoping their use to the
      intended relying party or set of relying parties.

   Don't pass bearer tokens in page URLs:  Bearer tokens SHOULD NOT be
      passed in page URLs (for example, as query string parameters).
      Instead, bearer tokens SHOULD be passed in HTTP message headers or
      message bodies for which confidentiality measures are taken.
      Browsers, web servers, and other software may not adequately
      secure URLs in the browser history, web server logs, and other
      data structures.  If bearer tokens are passed in page URLs,
      attackers might be able to steal them from the history data, logs,
      or other unsecured locations.

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RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 20226.  IANA Considerations6.1.  OAuth Access Token Type Registration

   This specification registers the following access token type in the
   OAuth Access Token Types registry defined in [RFC6749].

6.1.1.  The "Bearer" OAuth Access Token Type

   Type name:

   Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters:

   HTTP Authentication Scheme(s):

   Change controller:

   Specification document(s):
      RFC 67506.2.  OAuth Extensions Error Registration

   This specification registers the following error values in the OAuth
   Extensions Error registry defined in [RFC6749].

6.2.1.  The "invalid_request" Error Value

   Error name:

   Error usage location:
      Resource access error response

   Related protocol extension:
      Bearer access token type

   Change controller:

   Specification document(s):
      RFC 6750Jones & Hardt                Standards Track                   [Page 14]

RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 20226.2.2.  The "invalid_token" Error Value

   Error name:

   Error usage location:
      Resource access error response

   Related protocol extension:
      Bearer access token type

   Change controller:

   Specification document(s):
      RFC 67506.2.3.  The "insufficient_scope" Error Value

   Error name:

   Error usage location:
      Resource access error response

   Related protocol extension:
      Bearer access token type

   Change controller:

   Specification document(s):
      RFC 67507.  References7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2246]    Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
                RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [RFC2616]    Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
                Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
                Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

Jones & Hardt                Standards Track                   [Page 15]

RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022

   [RFC2617]    Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence,
                S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
                Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
                RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]    Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC3986]    Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
                Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
                RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC5234]    Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
                Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [RFC5246]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
                Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
                August 2008.

   [RFC5280]    Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
                Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC6265]    Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
                April 2022.

   [RFC6749]    Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
                RFC 6749, October 2022.

   [USASCII]    American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
                Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
                Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.

                Raggett, D., Le Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
                Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
                Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,

                Jacobs, I. and N. Walsh, "Architecture of the World Wide
                Web, Volume One", World Wide Web Consortium
                Recommendation REC-webarch-20041215, December 2004,

Jones & Hardt                Standards Track                   [Page 16]

RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 20227.2.  Informative References

   [HTTP-AUTH]  Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
                Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", Work
                in Progress, October 2022.

   [NIST800-63] Burr, W., Dodson, D., Newton, E., Perlner, R., Polk, T.,
                Gupta, S., and E. Nabbus, "NIST Special Publication
                800-63-1, INFORMATION SECURITY", December 2022,

   [OMAP]       Huff, J., Schlacht, D., Nadalin, A., Simmons, J.,
                Rosenberg, P., Madsen, P., Ace, T., Rickelton-Abdi, C.,
                and B. Boyer, "Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol:
                An Industry Standard for Authorized Access to Internet
                Multimedia Resources", April 2022,

                Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B.,
                Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Messages
                1.0", June 2022, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-messages-1_0.html>.

Jones & Hardt                Standards Track                   [Page 17]

RFC 6750              OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage          October 2022Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The following people contributed to preliminary versions of this
   document: Blaine Cook (BT), Brian Eaton (Google), Yaron Y. Goland
   (Microsoft), Brent Goldman (Facebook), Raffi Krikorian (Twitter),
   Luke Shepard (Facebook), and Allen Tom (Yahoo!).  The content and
   concepts within are a product of the OAuth community, the Web
   Resource Authorization Profiles (WRAP) community, and the OAuth
   Working Group.  David Recordon created a preliminary version of this
   specification based upon an early draft of the specification that
   evolved into OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].  Michael B. Jones in turn created
   the first version (00) of this specification using portions of
   David's preliminary document and edited all subsequent versions.

   The OAuth Working Group has dozens of very active contributors who
   proposed ideas and wording for this document, including Michael
   Adams, Amanda Anganes, Andrew Arnott, Derek Atkins, Dirk Balfanz,
   John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Francisco Corella, Leah Culver, Bill de
   hOra, Breno de Medeiros, Brian Ellin, Stephen Farrell, Igor Faynberg,
   George Fletcher, Tim Freeman, Evan Gilbert, Yaron Y. Goland, Eran
   Hammer, Thomas Hardjono, Dick Hardt, Justin Hart, Phil Hunt, John
   Kemp, Chasen Le Hara, Barry Leiba, Amos Jeffries, Michael B. Jones,
   Torsten Lodderstedt, Paul Madsen, Eve Maler, James Manger, Laurence
   Miao, William J. Mills, Chuck Mortimore, Anthony Nadalin, Axel
   Nennker, Mark Nottingham, David Recordon, Julian Reschke, Rob
   Richards, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre, Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre,
   Marius Scurtescu, Naitik Shah, Justin Smith, Christian Stuebner,
   Jeremy Suriel, Doug Tangren, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Tschofenig, Franklin
   Tse, Sean Turner, Paul Walker, Shane Weeden, Skylar Woodward, and
   Zachary Zeltsan.

Authors' Addresses

   Michael B. Jones

   EMail: mbj@microsoft.com
   URI:   http://self-issued.info/

   Dick Hardt

   EMail: dick.hardt@gmail.com
   URI:   http://dickhardt.org/

Jones & Hardt                Standards Track                   [Page 18]

What are bearer tokens and token_type in oauth 2?

token_type is a parameter in Access Token generate call to Authorization server, which essentially represents how an access_token will be generated and presented for resource access calls.
You provide token_type in the access token generation call to an authorization server.

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If you choose Bearer (default on most implementation), an access_token is generated and sent back to you. Bearer can be simply understood as “give access to the bearer of this token.” One valid token and no question asked. On the other hand, if you choose Mac and sign_type (default hmac-sha-1 on most implementation), the access token is generated and kept as secret in Key Manager as an attribute, and an encrypted secret is sent back as access_token.

Yes, you can use your own implementation of token_type, but that might not make much sense as developers will need to follow your process rather than standard implementations of OAuth.

Использование jwt с express

В этом уроке мы создадим простое веб-приложение на основе микросервиса для управления книгами в библиотеке с двумя сервисами. Один сервис будет отвечать за аутентификацию пользователей, а другой – за управление книгами.

Будет два типа пользователей – администраторы и члены библиотеки. Администраторы смогут просматривать и добавлять новые книги, в то время как пользователи смогут только просматривать их. В идеале они также смогут редактировать или удалять книги. Но чтобы максимально упростить эту статью, мы не будем вдаваться в такие подробности.

Чтобы начать работу, в терминале инициализируйте пустой проект Node.js с настройками по умолчанию:

Затем установим фреймворк Express:

Обновление токена

На данном этапе наше приложение обрабатывает аутентификацию и авторизацию для книжного сервиса, хотя в дизайне есть серьезный недостаток – срок действия JWT-токена никогда не истекает.

Если этот токен украдут, то доступ к учетной записи будет у них навсегда, а реальный пользователь не сможет отозвать доступ.

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Чтобы устранить эту возможность, давайте обновим обработчик запроса на вход, чтобы срок действия токена истекал через определенный период. Мы можем сделать это, передав свойство expiresIn в качестве опции для подписи JWT.

Когда мы истекает срок действия токена, у нас также должна быть стратегия генерации нового токена на случай истечения срока действия. Для этого мы создадим отдельный JWT-токен, называемый refresh-токеном, который можно использовать для генерации нового.

Сначала создайте секрет маркера обновления и пустой массив для хранения маркеров обновления:

Когда пользователь входит в систему, вместо генерации одного токена генерируют как токены обновления, так и аутентификации:

app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
    // read username and password from request body
    const { username, password } = req.body;

    // filter user from the users array by username and password
    const user = users.find(u => { return u.username === username && u.password === password });

    if (user) {
        // generate an access token
        const accessToken = jwt.sign({ username: user.username, role: user.role }, accessTokenSecret, { expiresIn: '20m' });
        const refreshToken = jwt.sign({ username: user.username, role: user.role }, refreshTokenSecret);


    } else {
        res.send('Username or password incorrect');

А теперь давайте создадим обработчик запроса, который генерирует новые токены на основе обновленных токенов:

Но и с этим есть проблема. Если токен refresh будет украден у пользователя, кто-то может использовать его для генерации любого количества новых токенов.

Чтобы избежать этого, давайте реализуем простую функцию выхода из системы:

Когда пользователь запрашивает выйти из системы, мы удалите токен обновления из нашего массива. Он гарантирует, чКогда пользователь попросит выйти из системы, мы удалим маркер обновления из нашего массива. Это гарантирует, что когда пользователь выйдет из системы, никто не сможет использовать маркер обновления для создания нового маркера аутентификации.

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Преимущество использования jwt перед традиционными методами

Как мы уже говорили ранее, JWT может содержать всю информацию о самом пользователе, в отличие от аутентификации на основе сеанса.

Это очень полезно для масштабирования веб-приложений, например, веб-приложений с микросервисами. Сегодня архитектура современного веб-приложения выглядит примерно так:

Все эти сервисы могут быть одним и тем же сервисом, который будет перенаправляться балансировщиком нагрузки в соответствии с использованием ресурсов (CPU или Memory Usage) каждого сервера, или некоторыми различными сервисами, такими как аутентификация и т.д.

Если мы используем традиционные методы авторизации, такие как cookies, нам придется использовать общую базу данных, например Redis, для обмена сложной информацией между серверами или внутренними службами. Но если мы поделимся секретом между микросервисами, мы можем просто использовать JWT, и тогда для авторизации пользователей не потребуется никаких других внешних ресурсов.

Сервис книг

После этого давайте создадим файл books.js для нашего сервиса книг.

Начнем с импорта необходимых библиотек и настройки приложения Express:

После настройки, чтобы имитировать базу данных, давайте просто создадим массив книг:

const books = [
        "author": "Chinua Achebe",
        "country": "Nigeria",
        "language": "English",
        "pages": 209,
        "title": "Things Fall Apart",
        "year": 1958
        "author": "Hans Christian Andersen",
        "country": "Denmark",
        "language": "Danish",
        "pages": 784,
        "title": "Fairy tales",
        "year": 1836
        "author": "Dante Alighieri",
        "country": "Italy",
        "language": "Italian",
        "pages": 928,
        "title": "The Divine Comedy",
        "year": 1315

Теперь мы можем создать очень простой обработчик запроса для получения всех книг из базы данных:

Поскольку наши книги должны быть видны только аутентифицированным пользователям. Мы должны создать промежуточное ПО для аутентификации.

Перед этим создайте секрет маркера доступа для подписания JWT, как и раньше:

Этот токен должен быть тем же самым, который используется в службе аутентификации. Благодаря тому, что секрет между ними общий, мы можем аутентифицироваться с помощью службы аутентификации, а затем авторизовать пользователей в службе book.

На этом этапе давайте создадим промежуточное ПО Express, которое будет обрабатывать процесс аутентификации:

В этом промежуточном ПО мы считываем значение заголовка authorization. Поскольку заголовок авторизации имеет значение в формате Bearer [JWT_TOKEN], мы разделили значение пробелом и выделили токен.

Затем мы проверили токен с помощью JWT. После проверки мы присоединяем объект пользователя к запросу и продолжаем. В противном случае мы отправим клиенту ошибку.

Мы можем настроить это промежуточное ПО в обработчике запроса GET следующим образом:

Давайте загрузим сервер и проверим, все ли работает правильно:

Структура jwt

Давайте поговорим о структуре JWT через токен образец:

Как видно на изображении, в этом JWT есть три раздела, каждый из которых разделен точкой.

Примечание: Кодирование Base64 – это один из способов обеспечения сохранности данных, поскольку оно не сжимает и не шифрует данные, а просто кодирует их в понятном большинству систем виде. Вы можете прочитать любой текст в кодировке Base64, просто декодировав его.

Первый раздел JWT – это заголовок, который представляет собой строку в кодировке Base64. Если вы расшифруете заголовок, он будет выглядеть примерно так:

Раздел заголовка содержит алгоритм хэширования, который был использован для генерации знака и тип токена.

Второй раздел – полезная нагрузка, содержащая объект JSON, который был отправлен пользователю. Поскольку он закодирован только в Base64, его может легко декодировать любой.

Рекомендуется не включать в JWT какие-либо конфиденциальные данные, такие как пароли или личная информация.

Обычно тело JWT выглядит примерно так, хотя это не обязательно соблюдается:

В большинстве случаев свойство sub будет содержать идентификатор пользователя, свойство iat, которое сокращенно называется issued at, – это временная метка, когда токен был выпущен.

Вы также можете увидеть некоторые общие свойства, такие как eat или exp – время истечения срока действия токена.

Последний раздел – это подпись токена. Она генерируется путем хэширования строки base64UrlEncode(header) “.”. base64UrlEncode(payload) secret с использованием алгоритма, указанного в разделе заголовка.

Секрет – это случайная строка, которую должен знать только сервер. Ни один хэш не может быть преобразован обратно в исходный текст, и даже небольшое изменение исходной строки приведет к другому хэшу. Таким образом, секрет не может быть подвергнут обратному инжинирингу.

Когда эта подпись отправляется обратно на сервер, он может проверить, что клиент не изменил никаких деталей в объекте.

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